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Abstract—In the era of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies
the potential for privacy invasion is becoming a major concern
especially in regards to healthcare data and Ambient Assisted
Living (AAL) environments. Systems that offer AAL technologies
make extensive use of personal data in order to provide services
that are context-aware and personalized. This makes privacy
preservation a very important issue especially since the users
are not always aware of the privacy risks they could face.
A lot of progress has been made in the deep learning field,
however, there has been lack of research on privacy preservation
of sensitive personal data with the use of deep learning. In this
paper we focus on a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Encoder-
Decoder, which is a principal component of deep learning, and
propose a new encoding technique that allows the creation of
different AAL data views, depending on the access level of the end
user and the information they require access to. The efficiency
and effectiveness of the proposed method are demonstrated
with experiments on a simulated AAL dataset. Qualitatively, we
show that the proposed model learns privacy operations such as
disclosure, deletion and generalization and can perform encoding
and decoding of the data with almost perfect recovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic demographic change in most western coun-
tries will increase the need for development of new Ambi-
ent Intelligence (AmI) technologies making use of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) [28]. The new
EU Data Protection regulations applying from 2018 onwards
[2] will make privacy aware machine learning necessary
[23]. Consequently, issues of privacy, security, safety and
data protection move more and more into the focus of AI
and ML, thereby fostering an integrated ML approach [17],
which emphasizes the importance of the human-in-the-loop.
Currently, major threats to privacy come from personal data
aggregation and the increasing power of data mining and
pattern recognition techniques, as well as from healthcare
data sharing and analysis. As the number of information
sources increases the potential to combine these sources,
profile the users and learn sensitive information about them
also increases, which makes it a great threat to individual
privacy. This an important issue especially in the field of AAL
where the users are not always aware of the privacy risks they
might face.
To address the threats mentioned previously we propose a
model for the encoding and sharing of combined healthcare
and AAL data. The model aims to achieve the privacy of
input data before they are distributed to various stakeholders.
To protect the privacy a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
encoder-decoder system is designed that allows the creation
of different data views to correspond to the access level of the
receiver.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents an overview of existing privacy techniques and
related work for deep learning in privacy. Section 3 introduces
the proposed privacy model. Section 4 describes the case
study and explains the performed experiments while Section
5 presents the results and the performance of the algorithm.
Lastly, Section 6 includes the conclusion and suggestions for
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section is divided into three parts. The first part gives
an overview of privacy definitions and identifiers. The second
describes previous work done in regards to privacy preserving
techniques while the third part gives an introduction to deep
learning and overview of existing work in privacy protection
with the use of deep learning techniques.
A. Private Data
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
[2] defines personal data as “any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person” and specifically
acknowledges that this includes both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
identification. The identification can be by means of “an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity”. While so far there is not one privacy definition yet
that is able to encompass all the different aspects of privacy,
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there are guidelines that list the possible identifiers that could
be used to identify a person from a group [3] [1]:
1) Names, Geographical subdivisions smaller than a state,
Dates (other than year)
2) Phone & Fax Numbers
3) Electronic mail addresses
4) Social Security, Medical Record & Health plan benefi-
ciary numbers
5) Account & Certificate/license numbers
6) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers (including license
plate numbers)
7) Device identifiers and serial numbers
8) Web Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) & Internet
Protocol (IP) address numbers
9) Biometric identifiers, including finger, retinal and voice
prints
10) Full face photographic images and any comparable im-
ages
11) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic or
code
However, the above list of identifiers is not exhaustive, as
technology advances more potential identifiers could emerge.
B. Privacy Preservation with Anonymization Methods
Privacy enhancing technologies protect the users’ privacy
based on technology, and can offer additional levels of protec-
tion than just relying on laws and policies. In order to address
the privacy concerns of the users, several approaches have
been proposed by the research community. These approaches
include information manipulation, privacy and context aware-
ness, access control and data anonymization. In the sections
below the anonymization are further analyzed since they are
the methods most commonly used for privacy preservation.
1) k-Anonymity: A very well-known method to anonymize
data before releasing them is k-anonymity [29]. In a k-
anonymized dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at
least k − 1 other records in regards to specific identifying at-
tributes [31]. k-anonymity is achieved by suppressing (deleting
an attribute value from the data and replacing it with a random
value that matches any possible attribute value) or generalizing
the attributes in the data, which means that an attribute is
replaced with a less specific but semantically consistent value
[29]. The utility and privacy of the data are connected. There
is no way so far that can increase the data privacy without
also decreasing the data utility [24]. The objective in these
problems is to maximize utility by minimizing the amount of
generalization and suppression. Achieving k -anonymity by
generalization with this objective as a constraint is a Non-
deterministic Polynomial-time hard (NP hard) problem which
cannot be solved fully automatically [25] [18]. In most cases
k -anonymity is able to prevent identity disclosure so that a
record in a k-anonymized data set cannot be connected again
to the corresponding record in the original data set. But in
some cases, it may fail to protect against attribute disclosure.
2) l-diversity: This method was developed to address the
weaknesses of k-anonymity, which as shown, does not guaran-
tee privacy against adversaries that use background knowledge
or in cases where data are lacking diversity. For l-diversity,
the anonymization conditions are satisfied if, for each group
of records sharing a combination of key attributes, there are
at least l -“well-represented” values for each confidential
attribute [22]. The disadvantage of this method is that it
depends on the range of the sensitive attributes. If l-diversity is
to be applied to a sensitive attribute that does not have many
different values, artificial data will have to be inserted. The
use of artificial data will improve the privacy but may result in
problems with the analysis thus ruining the utility of the data.
Also, this method is vulnerable to skewness and similarity
attack so it cannot always prevent attribute disclosure.
3) t-closeness: As shown l-diversity might not always be
sufficient in preventing attribute disclosure. Since it does not
account for the semantic closeness of the sensitive values.
A new method named t- closeness was proposed in [21] to
address these problems. This method requires the distribution
of the sensitive attributes in an equivalent class to be close
to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table, which
in turn means that the distance between the two distributions
should be no more than a specified threshold t. While the
authors in [21] describe ways to check t-closeness (using
several distances between distributions), no computational
procedure to enforce this property is given [10]. The authors
proposing the t-closing method [21] mention that t-closeness
limits the amount of useful information that is released. The
only way to increase the utility of the data is to increase the
threshold t, which in turn decreases the privacy protection.
As seen from the overview of the strengths and weaknesses
of each technique k-anonymity and the other anonymization
methods are not always successful in guarantying that no
information is leaked while ensuring usable data levels. While
the methods of k-anonymity and l-diversity do not always
accomplish complete privacy, the method of t-closeness pro-
vides it. But sometimes it is at the expense of the correlations
between confidential attributes and key attributes. Also, the
computational method for a specific dataset to be anonymized
is an additional problem of this method. The papers defining
k-anonymity and l-diversity propose approaches based on
generalization and suppression which a lot of times can cause
numerical attributes to become categorical. In the case of
t-closeness, a computational procedure to reach it is not
described. Thus, some issues in this field are still open, both at
a conceptual and computational level, which can be improved
by defining better properties and by creating more effective
methods.
C. Privacy Preservation with Deep Learning
Deep learning is a promising area of machine learning
research with significant success in recent years. So far the
applications of deep learning are being used in various systems
such as image and speech recognition, data analysis, social
media, bioinformatics, medicine, and healthcare. Usually, deep
learning architectures are constructed as multi-layer neural
networks. There are several different neural network architec-
tures, such as the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [13], the
feed-forward neural network [4] and the Deep Belief Network
(DBN) [14]. Deep learning has the ability to transform original
data into a higher level with more abstract expressions. That
means that high-dimensional original data can be converted to
low-dimensional data by training multiple neural networks on
how to reconstruct the high-dimensional input data.
However, the existing literature on privacy protection mostly
focuses on traditional privacy preserving methods, as described
in the previous section, and not on deep learning. Differ-
ential privacy proposed by Dwork [11] is one of the few
approaches of privacy protection that makes use of machine
learning methods. Applications of Differential Privacy include
boosting [12], principal component analysis [7], linear and
logistic regression [5], [32] support vector machines [26], risk
minimization [6], [30] and continuous data processing [27].
However, the most relevant work to this paper is that of Dai
et al. [9] in which they used an Encoder-Decoder system to
protect private information in videos by extracting the privacy
region and scrambling it while encoding. The system allows
the users to fully restore the original video only if they have
a legitimate key, otherwise, they can only see the non private
regions in the video.
III. LSTM ENCODER-DECODER MODEL
Long Short Term Memory networks are a special kind
of RNN, capable of learning long-term dependencies [16].
A basic sequence-to-sequence model, as introduced in [8],
consists of two recurrent neural networks (RNNs). The first is
an encoder that processes the input and the second a decoder
that generates the output. The recurrently connected blocks
in LSTM layers are known as memory blocks. Each block
contains one or more memory cells which are composed of
three units: an input gate, a forget gate and an output gate.
These gates modulate the interactions between the memory
cell and the environment. Figure 1 shows the single cell of
LSTM memory block. LSTM can assist in error minimization
because the error can be back-propagated through time and
layers. By maintaining a more constant error, the recurrent
network can continue to learn over many time steps, and thus
be able to link causes and effects.
The model that was developed in this work uses the multi-
layered Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) encoder to map the
input sequence to a vector of a fixed dimensionality, and then
another LSTM is used to decode the target sequence from the
vector. The encoder network is the part of the network that
takes the input sequence and maps it to an encoded repre-
sentation of the sequence. The encoded representation is then
used by the decoder network to generate an output sequence.
This makes the framework have a lock and key analogy,
where only someone with the correct key (decoder) will be
able to access the resources behind the lock (encoder). The
multiple hidden layers of neural networks have characteristics
that enable this kind of learning [15], along with the mapping
Fig. 1: LSTM single cell image [33].
characteristic of the encoder-decoder models which are able
to create corresponding pairs could make them appropriate for
privacy preserving frameworks.
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
The experiments were conducted using as basis the LSTM
Encoder-Decoder model introduced in the previous section.
In the following sections we describe the evaluation use case
scenario and details of the simulated dataset used for the study
followed by the modeling and training methodology.
A. Use case
John is 80 years old and lives in an ambient assisted living
environment. He is widowed and was recently diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease. Currently, he lives alone but he likes to
stay in touch with his family and friends. The AAL envi-
ronment he lives in gives him independence and allows him
to control his home automation system, for example, he can
remotely open and close windows/doors, control the lighting,
heating, and the alarm system. Also, it allows monitoring of
his vital signs and offers him reminders about medication and
appointments. The sensors deployed in the home send the
collected information to the cloud offering access to, family
members, care givers, doctors, and researchers.
In this use case scenario, four different views of the data
are being created (Figure 2) depending on the access level of
the receiver and the preferences of the user (Table I). The user
in this scenario has a very close relationship with his family
and trusts [34], [19] his caregiver so he has selected almost all
his information to be accessible to them, especially because
he feels safer knowing they will be able to help him in case
of emergency. With regards to doctors, he has allowed only
some basic personal and medical information to be visible to
them so a different view is created for them. And finally for
research purposes, the view that is created does not show any
explicit personal data and most of the other sensitive attributes
are generalized.
Fig. 2: Conceptual System Architecture
B. Dataset
For the purposes of this work data related to AAL were
simulated. The type of data that were selected are divided
into three categories: personal, medical and smart home sensor
attributes. Each entry of the simulated data includes these
three kinds of attributes. Personal attributes are those that can
explicitly identify a person such as name, address and phone
number. The second includes attributes that could potentially
identify a person such as gender and birth date. Lastly, the third
category includes sensitive medical information and sensor
data, like blood pressure, medical history and presence sensors
(Table I).
TABLE I: Simulated Data and Access to Information
Attribute Family
Member
Doctor Caregiver Researcher
Name F F F D
Age F F G G
Gender F F F F
Height F F G G
Weight F F G G
Address F G F G
Phone Number F F F D
Occupation F G G G
Marital Status F G G G
Timestamp F F F F
Blood Pressure G F F G
Glucose level G F F G
Disease F F F G
Wearable
Pedometer
F F F F
Presence Sensor F D F F
Temperature Sen-
sor
F F F G
Light Sensor F D D F
Window Sensor F D F D
External Door
Sensor
F D F D
Energy
Consumption
G D D G
Abbreviations F: fully disclosed, G: generalized, D: deleted
The simulation of the data was based on real world data
collected from AAL environments and it included personal
information, health care data as well as smart home sensor
data. The data were simulated for 10000 users, which each
user having 100 entries.
C. Model Configuration
As described previously, the proposed model makes use of
the LSTM neural network architecture that learns to encode
a variable-length input sequence into a fixed-length vector
representation and to decode a given fixed-length vector
representation back into a variable-length sequence. On this
neural network three types of operations are applied to the
encoder input by the decoder. These three operations are: 1)
Disclosure which means keeping the data as it is 2) Deletion by
removing the data or 3) Generalization which means replacing
the value with a less specific but semantically consistent
value. So the data from each entry can be fully disclosed to
the receiver, generalized or deleted. Each value for a given
attribute has different range aligned with real life values.
Four separate views are created for different receivers, family
member, doctor, caregiver, and researcher. Each receiver has
a different decoder output due to their privacy clearances on
patient information (Table I).
Fig. 3: Illustration of the proposed LSTM Encoder-Decoder
Privacy Model
In Figure 3 the overall functionality of the encoder and
decoder LSTM layers of the model are depicted. While in
Figure 4 we show in more detail how the privacy operations
work when the model reads an input sentence such as “John
has Alzheimer” which will produce “* has Dementia” as the
output sentence. In this instance the operation of deletion is
applied on the Name attribute so ‘John’ is transformed to ‘*’
and the operation of generalization is applied on the Disease
attribute which changes ‘Alzheimer’ to ‘Dementia’. The model
stops making predictions after outputting the end-of-string
token ‘eos’.
Fig. 4: Example of the model’s Privacy Operations
D. Model Training and Testing
For the experiments the models were trained with 800.000
data entries and tested with 200.000 unseen entries. Each user
entry consisted of different attribute as shown in Table I and
their corresponding values, each entry had 160 characters at
most. Different attributes are separated with ‘|’ in order to
easily distinguish between different attributes in an entry. A
40 character set was used as dictionary. Each sequence is
maximum 160 characters long and ends with special token
‘eos’. In order to handle different sequence lengths, we zero
padded each entry to the maximum number of characters
which in our case is 160. The encoder and decoder comprise
an LSTM network which has 256 hidden units and is trained
with Adam [20] with a learning rate of 0.0004.
V. RESULTS
We qualitatively analyzed the trained model’s results by
comparing the decoded outputs with those of the expected
model output after the privacy operations. The qualitative
analysis shows that the LSTM Encoder Decoder is very good
at learning the privacy operations of disclosure, generalization
and deletion as well as at capturing the specified preferences
in the access to information table. An example of the results
of the model can be seen in the following figures.
Fig. 5: Researcher view (With matching Encoder and Decoder)
In Figure 5, it can be seen that with the use of the
right encoder-decoder mechanism the user’s information can
be transferred almost perfectly to the researcher with the
appropriate privacy rules applied for the researcher’s access
level. And since only the encoded vector is shared it is not
possible to get user information without the right decoder.
Fig. 6: Care Giver view (With not matching Encoder and
Decoder)
Figure 6, showcases one of the most beneficial parts of our
model. In this case, we explore the possibility that a Caregiver
tries to access the data meant for the Researcher. Because the
encoded vector of user information was shared, it would not be
possible to decode it unless the right decoder was used. If the
encoder and decoder do not match it is not possible to decode
and access the user’s private information. If the end receiver
does not have the correct decoder it is almost impossible to
find the right decoder weights since it is very high dimensional
floating point vector.
The model has on average 1.5 character error per entry
in testing. One or two characters error given the length of
160 characters per entry is very close to perfect recovery.
Different decoders are trained for each view and all had the
same very close error (1.5 char/entry) during testing. Decoders
are shown to be capable of deleting, generalizing or keeping
the information given by the encoder. The qualitative analysis
of the trained model and the results shows that most of the
time the 1 character mistake is in the attribute Timestamp. We
attribute this error to the incremental nature of the Timestamp
attribute, but this will have to be further investigated with
additional experiments. Through these results, we show that
the Encoder-Decoder model is able to learn operation rules
in a privacy setting by disclosing, generalizing or deleting
specific attributes. Thus, this model is able to learn the users’
preferences in regards to the privacy policy and create sub-
datasets for each receiver with the appropriate information for
each one.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Our LSTM Encoder-Decoder model is able to learn privacy
operations such as disclosure, generalization, and deletion
of data, therefore it can generate different data views for
data receivers in an encrypted way. It allows users to train
independently on their own datasets and selectively share
small subsets of their key attributes to specific receivers by
creating different views for each one. This offers an attractive
point in regards to the utility and privacy trade-off. Two goals
are achieved in an end-to-end manner by using the LSTM
based encoder and decoder. One is to get an encoded version
of user information while the second one is to decode this
encoded information according to privacy rules defined by
the user. The encoded private information of the user can not
be decoded unless the right decoder is used. If an adversary
tried using a different decoder on encoded information the
system would not disclose any information. Without the right
decoder, it would not be possible to train a decoder on encoded
information due to the very high dimensionality of the LSTM
hidden state vector and possible values of each LSTM network
parameter. This way the users preserve the privacy of their
data while receiving the benefits of the AAL environment.
Moreover, the model can handle raw data even in text format,
which is very beneficial in the case of medical records which
usually include a lot of doctors’ and nurses’ notes. This work
is a preliminary experimental study in preserving privacy with
the use of LSTM Encoders-Decoders. One of the model’s
limitations, that will be addressed in future work, is the
tokenization of the attributes to improve the performance.
Another limitation is the use of simulated data which means
they do not contain missing or abnormal values to evaluate
the robustness of the method. Future work will also include
the expansion of the model to real world data, as well as
more complex data formats such as meta-data and multimedia
formats.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been funded by the European Union Horizon
2020 MSCA ITN ACROSSING project (GA no. 616757).
The authors would like to thank the members of the project’s
consortium for their valuable inputs.
REFERENCES
[1] Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97)
5 on the Protection of Medical Data. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/
coerecr97-5.html.
[2] EU General Data Protection Regulation. http://www.eugdpr.org.
[3] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Of
1996. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/html/
PLAW-104publ191.htm.
[4] George Bebis and Michael Georgiopoulos. Feed-forward neural net-
works. IEEE Potentials, 13(4):27–31, 1994.
[5] Kamalika Chaudhuri and Claire Monteleoni. Privacy-preserving logistic
regression. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 289–296, 2009.
[6] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Claire Monteleoni, and Anand D Sarwate. Dif-
ferentially private empirical risk minimization. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 12(Mar):1069–1109, 2011.
[7] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Anand D Sarwate, and Kaushik Sinha. A near-
optimal algorithm for differentially-private principal components. Jour-
nal of Machine Learning Research, 14(1):2905–2943, 2013.
[8] Kyunghyun Cho, Bart Van Merrie¨nboer, Caglar Gulcehre, Dzmitry Bah-
danau, Fethi Bougares, Holger Schwenk, and Yoshua Bengio. Learning
phrase representations using rnn encoder-decoder for statistical machine
translation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1078, 2014.
[9] Feng Dai, Dongming Zhang, and Jintao Li. Encoder/decoder for privacy
protection video with privacy region detection and scrambling. In MMM
(2), pages 525–527, 2013.
[10] Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Vicenc¸ Torra. A critique of k-anonymity and
some of its enhancements. In ARES 2008, pages 990–993. IEEE, 2008.
[11] Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography
and Security, pages 338–340. Springer, 2011.
[12] Cynthia Dwork, Guy N Rothblum, and Salil Vadhan. Boosting and
differential privacy. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010
51st Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 51–60. IEEE, 2010.
[13] Christoph Goller and Andreas Kuchler. Learning task-dependent dis-
tributed representations by backpropagation through structure. In Neural
Networks, 1996., IEEE International Conference on, volume 1, pages
347–352. IEEE, 1996.
[14] Geoffrey E Hinton. Deep belief networks. Scholarpedia, 4(5):5947,
2009.
[15] Geoffrey E Hinton and Ruslan R Salakhutdinov. Reducing the dimen-
sionality of data with neural networks. science, 313(5786):504–507,
2006.
[16] Sepp Hochreiter and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory.
Neural computation, 9(8):1735–1780, 1997.
[17] Andreas Holzinger, Randy Goebel, Vasile Palade, and Massimo Ferri.
Towards integrative machine learning and knowledge extraction. In Lec-
ture Notes in Artificial Intelligence LNAI 10344, pages 1–12. Springer,
Cham, 2017.
[18] Andreas Holzinger, Markus Plass, Katharina Holzinger, Gloria Cerasela
Crisan, Camelia-M. Pintea, and Vasile Palade. A glass-box interactive
machine learning approach for solving np-hard problems with the
human-in-the-loop. arXiv:1708.01104, 2017.
[19] Andreas Holzinger, Klaus Schaupp, and Walter Eder-Halbedl. An
investigation on acceptance of ubiquitous devices for the elderly in an
geriatric hospital environment: using the example of person tracking. In
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS 5105, pages 22–29. Springer,
Heidelberg, 2008.
[20] D. Kingma and J. Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[21] Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian. t-closeness:
Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity. In Data Engineering, 2007.
ICDE 2007. IEEE 23rd International Conference on, pages 106–115.
IEEE, 2007.
[22] Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, Johannes Gehrke, and Muthu-
ramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam. l-diversity: Privacy beyond k-
anonymity. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data
(TKDD), 1(1):3, 2007.
[23] Bernd Malle, Peter Kieseberg, Sebastian Schrittwieser, and Andreas
Holzinger. Privacy aware machine learning and the right to be forgotten.
ERCIM News (special theme: machine learning), 107(3):22–23, 2016.
[24] Paul Ohm. Broken promises of privacy: Responding to the surprising
failure of anonymization. 2009.
[25] Hyoungmin Park and Kyuseok Shim. Approximate algorithms for k-
anonymity. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMOD international
conference on Management of data, pages 67–78. ACM, 2007.
[26] Benjamin IP Rubinstein, Peter L Bartlett, Ling Huang, and Nina Taft.
Learning in a large function space: Privacy-preserving mechanisms for
svm learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:0911.5708, 2009.
[27] Anand D Sarwate and Kamalika Chaudhuri. Signal processing and
machine learning with differential privacy: Algorithms and challenges
for continuous data. IEEE signal processing magazine, 30(5):86–94,
2013.
[28] Deepika Singh, Johannes Kropf, Sten Hanke, and Andreas Holzinger.
Ambient assisted living technologies from the perspectives of older
people and professionals. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS
10410, pages 255–266. Springer, Cham, 2017.
[29] Latanya Sweeney. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. Interna-
tional Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems,
10(05):557–570, 2002.
[30] Martin J Wainwright, Michael I Jordan, and John C Duchi. Privacy
aware learning. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 1430–1438, 2012.
[31] Xiaokui Xiao and Yufei Tao. Personalized privacy preservation. In
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGMOD international conference on
Management of data, pages 229–240. ACM, 2006.
[32] Jun Zhang, Zhenjie Zhang, Xiaokui Xiao, Yin Yang, and Marianne
Winslett. Functional mechanism: regression analysis under differential
privacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 5(11):1364–1375, 2012.
[33] Shu Zhang, Dequan Zheng, Xinchen Hu, and Ming Yang. Bidirectional
long short-term memory networks for relation classification. In PACLIC,
2015.
[34] Martina Ziefle, Carsten Rcker, and Andreas Holzinger. Medical tech-
nology in smart homes: Exploring the user’s perspective on privacy,
intimacy and trust. In 35th COMPSAC, pages 410–415. IEEE, Munich,
2011.
